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CASE NOTES
Labor Law—Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions—Clear Proof
Standard of Norris-LaGuardia Acti—Ramsey v. United Mine Work-
ers of America. 2 — Plaintiffs, small coal mine operators, sued defendant
union and various major coal producers,a alleging a conspiracy to
restrain trade in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.'
Plaintiffs sought to show an express or implied agreement between the
United Mine Workers of America (UMW) and the Bituminous Coal
Operators Association (hereinafter Operators Association) 6 to impose
provisions of the 1950 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
(hereinafter Wage Agreement)° on all coal mine operators, with
knowledge that the smaller nonmechanized ones, plaintiffs included,
would be unable to meet Wage Agreement terms and be driven out of
business. Plaintiffs based their express-agreement claim upon a 1958
amendment to the Wage Agreement, the Protective Wage Clause (here-
inafter Wage Clause),7 and their implied-agreement claim upon the
29 U.S.C. § 106 (1970).
2 401 U.S. 302 (1971).
3 In the course of pre-trial procedure, all the defendants except the United Mine
Workers of America were dropped from the case. A full listing and description of the
parties plaintiff and defendant are given in Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of America,
265 F. Supp. 388, 392, 400-03 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
4 Section 1 provides that "felvery contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Section 2 provides that "Ce]very person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . • . ." 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
3 The Bituminous Coal Operators Association was farmed in June, 1950, as a col-
lective bargaining agency for coal mine operators. At one time a total of 262 coal com-
panies were members of the agency, including both large and small companies. A com-
prehensive description of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association is provided in 265 F.
Supp. at 407-08.
The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement was originally adopted on
March 5, 1950. Negotiations for the Agreement, the subject of intense national interest,
were conducted under close supervision and pressure from the federal government. The
Agreement was amended in 1951, 1952, 1955, 1956, and 1958. Id. at 406-08, 410,
7 Paragraph A of the Protective Wage Clause provides that:
During the period of this Contract, the United Mine Workers of America will
not enter into, be a party to, nor will it permit any agreement or understanding
covering any wages, hours, or other conditions of work applicable to employees
covered by this Contract on any basis other than those specified in this Con-
tract or any applicable District Contract. The United Mine Workers of America
will diligently perform and enforce without discrimination or favor the condi-
tions of this paragraph and all other terms and conditions of this Contract and
will use and exercise its continuing best efforts to obtain full compliance there-
with by each and all the parties signatory thereto.
Id. at 411.
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Wage Clause and subsequent activities of the UMW and major
operators.'
The trial court dismissed the case for failure of proof, finding
that the Wage Clause could not be construed to be an express commit-
ment by the UMW not to bargain on terms other than the Wage
Agreement.' The court also found that the plaintiffs had not satisfied
the standard of "clear proof" required by Section 6 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Ace° with respect to the allegation of an implied agree-
ment by the UMW to impose terms of the Wage Agreement on the
smaller operators." As regards the latter finding, the trial judge de-
termined that, under the usual standard of proof applied in civil
actions, the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, 12 a finding
against the union would be required? He apparently concluded,
however, that section 6 requires clear proof that the alleged acts
occurred, that the acts revealed a conspiracy, and that they had caused
harm to the plaintiff. 14
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the deci-
sion of the lower court, finding error in the application of the clear
proof standard? The UMW, however, obtained a rehearing of the
appeal. Sitting en banc, the Circuit Court of Appeals was evenly
divided, thereby affirming the district court opinion."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari" and, in reversing the
decision of the Court of Appeals, HELD: Section 6 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act "requires clear and convincing evidence only as to the
Union's authorization, participation in, or ratification of the acts
allegedly performed on its behalf."' The Court ruled that in antitrust
8 These activities are discussed at p. 389 infra.
O The trial judge held that the language of Paragraph A of the Protective Wage
Clause committed the union only to enforce the contract uniformly as between parties
signatory to the contract. 265 F. Supp. at 411-12.
19 Section 6 of the Act provides, in part, that:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or
organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held respon-
sible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of indivi-
dual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation
in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after
actual knowledge thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 106 (1970).
11 265 F. Supp. at 432.
12 "'[This] means that the inferences from the testimony are such as to persuade
that the occurrence of an essential fact was more likely or probable than its non-occur-
rence'" (emphasis in original). Universe Tankships, Inc. v. Pyrate Tank Cleaners, Inc.,
152 F. Supp. 903, 920 (1957).
18 The trial court stated that "[w]ere this case being tried upon the usual prepon-
derance of the evidence rule applicable in civil cases, the Court would conclude that the
U.M.W. did so impliedly agree." 265 F. Supp. at 412.
14 401 U.S. at 307.
18 Id.
le Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of America, 416 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969),
17 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
18 401 U.S. at 311.
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actions instituted against labor unions, the standard of proof to be
met for establishing the occurrence of illegal acts, or determining that
the acts constitute a conspiracy, is the normal preponderance of the
evidence standard utilized in civil actions. The Court noted that the
consequences of affirming the lower courts' interpretation of section 6
would be to fashion a new standard of proof applicable in antitrust
actions against labor unions.'9
The Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 6 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in Ramsey represents an attempt to resolve the am-
biguities and doubts created by prior judicial determinations regarding
the antitrust liability of labor unions. More specifically, the Ramsey
interpretation clarifies the rule expressed by the Supreme Court in
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington 2° that "a labor union
forfeits its exemption from antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that
it has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale
on other bargaining units." 2'
This note will briefly examine the history of the national policy
toward the labor movement as regards antitrust violations. The Court's
holding in Ramsey will then be discussed in light of the Pennington
decision and the legislative history and prior case law concerning
Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The first case to decide labor union liability for antitrust violations
was Loewe v. Lawlor" in which the Supreme Court held that the
Sherman Act prohibited concerted labor activities as well as combina-
tions of capital if the result was a restraint of trade. The resulting
judgment caused damages in the amount of $240,000 to be levied
against poor workers and their families. The Court reasoned that their
membership in the union had made them parties to the conspiracy
which the union was found to have perpetrated. The decision was met
by a storm of public protest." As a result, Congress, in 1914, enacted
Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 24 designed to protect labor
unions from antitrust liability.
ID Id.
20 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
21 Id. at 665.
22
 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
28 J. Williams, Labor Relations and the Law 36 (3d ed. 1965).
24 Section 6 provides, in part:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Noth-
ing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence
and operation of labor . . . organizations ... or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof . .
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970).
Section 20 placed limitations on the granting of injunctions in labor disputes "un-
less necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the
party making the application." The section further states that "no such restraining order
or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons .. . from ceasing to perform any
work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means
to do so ... and for lawful purposes." 29 U.S.C. 52 (1970).
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In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 25
 however, the Supreme
Court virtually ignored the national policy expressed in the Clayton
Act and frustrated congressional purpose by narrowly interpreting
Sections 6 and 20. In Duplex the Court granted an injunction against
the International Association of Machinists, forbidding the union to
pursue a policy of secondary boycotts and sympathetic strikes ini-
tiated as a result of complainant's refusal to permit organization of
his plant. Justice Pitney, speaking for the majority, held that the
Clayton Act did not bar an injunction in this case, partly because
statutory language such as "peaceful" and "lawful" indicated that the
statute dealt solely with conduct which would have been unlawful,
even prior to enactment of the statute."
The Court's ruling in Duplex was expanded in 1921 in American
Steel Foundries v. Tri -City Central Trades Council. 27 In Tri-City the
Court upheld an order enjoining the labor organization from picketing
the employer's plant, declaring that a picket line consisting of more
than one representative at each point of ingress and egress at the
plant amounted to "intimidation," and that "persuasion or communi-
cation attempted in such a presence and under such conditions was
anything but peaceable and lawful.""
In reaction to the Court's failure to effectuate the policy of the
Clayton Act, Congress, in 1932, again expressed its desire to protect
labor unions from antitrust liability through enactment of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act." The Act clearly limits the equity jurisdiction of
federal courts in cases "growing out of a labor dispute,"" and defines
a public policy designed to promote collective bargaining."
The first major case dealing with labor union antitrust violations
following enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader.' In Apex the Court virtually ignored the Norris-La-
Guardia Act, but did take a step toward fostering union organization
and collective bargaining by holding that, since the acts of the union
involved merely a local dispute between an employer and his em-
ployees, the Sherman Act did not restrict union activities unless they
had or were intended to have an effect upon commercial competition.
Furthermore, the Court held that even where commercial competition
was affected by an otherwise lawful union activity, "this effect on
competition has not been considered to be the kind of curtailment of
price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act.""
25 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
26
 Id. at 473-74.
2T 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
28 Id. at 205.
29 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
85 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
81 19 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
82
 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
83 Id. at 503-04.
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In United States v. Hutcheson,' the Supreme Court formally
recognized and explained in detail the national policy toward labor
unions as expressed in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Speaking for the
majority, Justice Frankfurter noted that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
"explicitly formulated the 'public policy of the United States' in regard
to the industrial conflict, and by its light established that the allowable
area of union activity was not to be restricted, as it had been in the
Duplex case, to an immediate employer-employee relation!' The
Court then held that activities of a labor union, in light of Section 20
of the Clayton Act" and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, are exempt from
antitrust prosecution, so long as the union "acts in its self-interest and
does not combine with non-labor groups." 37
Hutcheson was followed in 1945 by the decision in Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 88
which permitted antitrust prosecution of the union. In the latter
case the Court held that Congress did not intend to exempt from
antitrust prosecution a labor union which acted in concert with non-
labor groups with the purpose or intent of controlling prices or creating
a monopoly. The rule drawn from Hutcheson and Allen Bradley, then,
was that labor unions enjoyed virtual immunity from the antitrust
laws so long as they acted unilaterally and in their own interests."
The Hutcheson-Allen Bradley rule remained undisturbed until
1965,4° when, in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 41
 the Supreme
Court, while ostensibly supporting this rule, laid the groundwork for
limiting labor's exemption and for facilitating the implication of a
union-employer conspiracy to control the market. Pennington, which
arose from a fact situation similar to that in Ramsey, expanded the
Allen Bradley exception to Iabor's exemption by holding that "a union
forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown
that it has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage
scale on other bargaining units."" The problem presented by Penning-
ton was twofold: first, what quantum and quality of evidence is re-
quired to show that the union has so agreed with one set of employers;
and second, can such an agreement be inferred from a body of evidence
not showing intent to drive competitors out of business:44
 The answers
84 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
85 Id. at 231.
86 29 U.S.C. 1 52 (1970).
87 312 U.S. at 232.
88 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
89
 Zimmer and Silberman, Pennington and Jewel Tea: Antitrust Impact on Collec-
tive Bargaining, 11 Antitrust Bull. 857, 863 (1966).
90 Id. at 863-64.
91 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
42 Id. at 665.
48 See Zimmer and Silberman, supra note 39, at 873-75; 265 F. Supp. at 398-99;
Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U. L. Rev. 317,
322-23 (1966).
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to these questions cannot easily be gleaned from the Court's opinions,
since the Court was divided three ways in the case. 44
Justice White, speaking for the Pennington Court, indicated that
a union wage agreement with a multi-employer bargaining unit, fol-
lowed by the union's pursuance of its own interest in seeking similar
terms from other employers, without more was insufficient evidence to
support a charge of conspiracy. He stated that "there must be addi-
tional direct or indirect evidence of the conspiracy." 45 But the opinion
did not indicate what quantum or type of "additional evidence" must
be produced or what evidentiary standard must be met. In a strong
dissent to Justice White's opinion, Justice Goldberg expressed his fear
that a jury would be permitted to infer an illegal conspiracy on the
basis of the following factors: a wage agreement, an avowed union
policy of aiming for an industry-wide uniform wage scale, and the
removal of certain competing employers from the market as a result
of their inability to meet the union's wage demands. He was especially
concerned that the "additional evidence" required by Justice White
would include bargaining table discussion regarding the effect of a wage
increase on the competitive market."
The question of whether it was necessary to show union intent
to drive competitors of the allegedly conspiring employers out of
business was also left in doubt by the Pennington decision. In his con-
curring opinion in Pennington, Justice Douglas felt that a predatory
purpose must be shown on the part of the alleged conspirators in order
to prove a Sherman Act violation.47 Justice White's opinion, on the
44
 Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan concurred in the majority opinion
written by Justice White. 381 U.S. at 659-72. Justice Douglas was joined in his con-
curring opinion by Justices Black and Clark. Id. at 672-75. Justice Goldberg, joined by
Justices Harlan and Stewart, dissented from the opinion but concurred in the result.
Owing to the similarity of issues, Justice Goldberg's dissent in Pennington appears in
his dissenting opinion in Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc.,
381 U.S. 676, 697-735 (1965).
45
 381 U.S. at 665 n.2.
45
 Justice Goldberg specifically referred to the fact that:
Since collective bargaining inevitably involves and requires discussion of the
impact of the wage agreement reached with a particular employer or group of
employers upon competing employers, the effect of the Court's decision will be
to bar a basic element of collective bargaining from the conference room.
Id. at 714. See also, Cox, supra note 43, at 322-23, where the author states:
If proof that such discussions took place would permit a jury to infer that there
was an illegal combination, the Pennington case will drive the discussions under-
ground or else force employers and unions to engage in wage negotiations with-
out canvassing some of the most important economic consequences.
47
 The concurring opinion sets forth the elements of guilt as follows:
On the new trial the jury should be instructed that if there were an industry-
wide collective bargaining agreement whereby employers and the union agreed
on a wage scale that exceeded the financial ability of some operators to pay
and that if it was made for the purpose of forcing some employers out of
business, the union as well as the employers who participated in the arrangement
with the union should be found to have violated the Sherman Act.
381 U.S. at 672-73.
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other hand, required only the showing of a commercially damaging
result."
In Ramsey the plaintiffs, in support of their allegation of implied
agreement between the UMW and the Operators Association, pro-
duced evidence that bargaining subsequent to 1950 between the Union
and the Operators Association had been very peaceful, contrary to the
virulent conflict that had occurred prior to 1950;" that substantial
increases in wages, welfare fund royalties and other benefits negotiated
between the UMW and the Operators Association since 1950 had vir-
tually made mechanization essential to survival in the industry; " that
profits of the alleged conspiratorial mines had increased while those
of the smaller mines had decreased; 61  the UMW had purchased a
controlling interest in the Western Kentucky Coal Company at a net
loss of eight million dollars and had utilized its control of the company
to participate in bidding in the Tennessee Valley Authority coal mar-
ket; 62 and that the UMW had pursued a policy of striking mines
which refused to accept terms of the Wage Agreement, resulting in
violence and destruction to the property of the smaller mine operators."
The trial judge, while finding that each of the above facts had
been sufficiently proven, held that none of them could be considered
per se violative of the Sherman Act." The plaintiffs contended that
these facts, viewed as a whole and in connection with the Wage Clause,
provided sufficient evidence of an illegal conspiracy. However, the trial
judge, while agreeing that the evidence must be viewed as a whole for
purposes of inferring a conspiracy," held that the plaintiffs had failed
to meet the evidentiary requirement of Section 6 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act which necessitates a "clear proof" showing that these
facts did, indeed, amount to an illegal conspiracy." The trial judge
did state, however, that, "[w] ere this case being tried upon the usual
preponderance of the evidence rule applicable in civil cases, the Court
would conclude that the U.M.W. did so impliedly agree.""
The Supreme Court in Ramsey took issue with the evidentiary
standard attributed to section 6 by the lower courts. In holding that
the statute requires the "usual preponderance of the evidence" stan-
dard, rather than that of "clear proof," in order to establish a con-
49 See Zimmer and Silberman, supra note 39, at 869. Discussing justice White's
opinion in Pennington, the trial judge in Ramsey concluded: "[W]hile Justice White
would require proof of the conspiracy between the union and the favored employers, he
would appear to require no proof that the purpose was to put other employers out of
business." 265 F. Supp. at 398.
49 Id. at 407-08.
50 Id. at 433-34.
51 Id. at 409-10.
52 Id. at 412-22.
53 Id. at 427-29.
54 Id. at 408, 409, 422, 429-30, 433.
56 Id. at 431.
56
 Id. at 412.
57 Id.
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spiracy, the Court found that the plaintiffs produced "additional
evidence" of the conspiracy sufficient to satisfy that requirement as
expressed by Justice White in Pennington." Thus, Ramsey clarifies
the evidentiary problem posed in Pennington by indicating that the
"additional evidence" necessary for establishing a conspiracy is that
which creates an inference under the usual preponderance standard.
In Ramsey, the Court was faced for the first time with the
question of whether Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to
proof of the alleged illegal acts as well as to the agency relationship
in labor disputes. Section 6 was considered to some extent in United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. United States,"
and in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,' but in each of
these cases the Court restricted itself to the question of proper applica-
tion of the statute to the agency issue. In Carpenters, a criminal
prosecution of the union, the Court noted language in the legislative
history of section 6 which states that the statute was not "a new law
of agency," but rather a rule of evidence designed to properly enforce
the common law rule of agency where a labor dispute is involved."
Carpenters held that the purpose and effect of section 6 was
to relieve organizations, whether of labor or capital, and
members of those organizations from liability for damages
or imputation of guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes
by some individual officers or members of the .organization,
without clear proof that the organization or member charged
with responsibility for the offense actually participated, gave
prior authorization, or ratified such acts after actual knowl-
edge of their perpetration.",
In Gibbs, a civil action for damage to property allegedly caused
by union violence, the Court failed to mention any connection between
the standard of proof required by the statute and the acts of violence
themselves. The Court stated that, "[w] hat is required is proof, either
that the union approved the violence which occurred, or that it partici-
pated actively or by knowing tolerance in further acts . . . ."" It is
noteworthy that the Gibbs Court remanded . the case on the issue of
proof of agency while leaving undisturbed the finding that the violence
had, in fact, occurred. This ruling supports the inference that the
Court did not interpret section 6 as being applicable to proof of the
illegal acts. But the analogy to Ramsey is tenuous, since Gibbs, al-
though a civil case, was not concerned with the antitrust laws.
While the legislative history of section 6 is rather vague, its
58 See discussion at p. 388 supra.
" 330 U.S. 395 (1947).
00 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
61 330 U.S. at 402-03.
82 Id. at 403.
63 383 U.S. 739.
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congressional intendment may be inferred from the judicial treatment
of labor disputes prevailing at the time of its enactment. The Norris-
LaGuardia Act, enacted in 1932, severely restricted the then-increas-
ing number of federal court injunctions in actions involving genuine
labor disputes." The practice of many courts during this violent period
in the history of the labor movement was to hold the union responsible
for the conduct of individuals in whom was lodged no authority to
wield the power of the union." By overextending the doctrine of
conspiracy, in which the illegal act of one conspirator is charged to
all his co-conspirators, isolated acts of individuals were imputed to
the union, even though such individuals were believed in some in-
stances to be agents provocateurs, or to have held spurious member-
ship in the union during a strike." There is little doubt that section 6
was aimed at curbing such use of the law of agency, as well as at
clarification of that law, both necessitated by disagreement among the
lower courts regarding this issue.°7 Congress further indicated that
the underlying purpose of Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
to define the law of agency in labor dispute situations when, in 1947,
it enacted the Taft-Hartley Act." Section 301(e)" of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act "expressly provides that for purposes of that statute ... the
responsibility of a union for the acts of its officers and members is to
be measured by reference to ordinary doctrines of agency, rather than
the more stringent standards of § 6. 770
In his dissenting opinion in Ramsey, Justice Douglas, joined by
Justices Black, Harlan, and Marshall, reiterated the position he had
taken in Pennington: the union must be shown to have acted with
the "purpose and effect of driving the small, marginal operators out
of business"; 71 that section 6 requires clear proof that the "purpose
64 see, Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32
U. Chi, L. Rev. 659, 665 (1965).
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Machinists Local 287, 283 F. 557 (D. Mont. 1922);
Alaska S.S. Co. v. Intl Longshoremen's Ass'n of Puget Sound, 236 F. 964 (W.D. Wash.
1916); and Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists Local 14, 111 F. 49 (W.D. Tenn. 1901).
06 See Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Carpenters, 330 U.S. at 418.
07 During Senate hearings on the Norris-La Guardia Act, the Senate Subcommittee
reported that:
There has been a distinct conflict of opinion in the courts as to the degree of
proof required. Mere ex parte affidavits establishing a certain amount of lawless
conduct in the prosecution of a strike have been held in some instances to es-
tablish a "presumption" that the entire union and its officers were engaged in
an unlawful conspiracy; and, on the other hand, other courts have declined
thus to substitute inference for proof .
It is appropriate and necessary to define by legislation the proper rule of
evidence to be followed in this matter in federal courts. That is the only object
of section 6.
S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong. 1st Sess. 20-21 (1932), as quoted in 330 U.S. at 419 n.2.
68
 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1970).
es 29 U.S.C.	 185(e) (1970).
7° 383 U.S. at 726. See also, Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 304
n.17 (1962).
71 401 U.S. at 317.
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of the union was . . . to do in one or more operators.' The basis of
the argument is that, even if it is shown that the bargaining officers of
the union acted with the required predatory intent, it would be both
unfair and contrary to the will of Congress to impute illicit motive
to the union and its members, absent clear proof that the officers were
authorized to act with predatory intent and in concert with the non-
labor group. The dissenters in Ramsey reasoned that without such clear
proof the UMW officers who had concluded the Wage Agreement
and had directed the subsequent activities of the union must be con-
sidered to have been authorized only to pursue, unilaterally, the lawful
objective of obtaining an industry-wide uniform wage scale."
The arguments of the dissent are not without merit. If the purpose
and effect of section 6 is to relieve union members of liability for
lawless acts perpetrated by individual union officers, absent clear
proof of union authorization, participation in, or ratification of such
acts, as interpreted by Carpenters; T4 and, if in order to be deemed law-
less the acts must have been committed with the purpose of forcing some
employers out of business, as asserted by Justice Douglas in Pen-
nington; 75 then, it seems implicit that section 6 requires clear proof
that the union itself, that is, all members of the union, possessed preda-
tory intent or knowledge of the union officers' predatory intent. There-
fore, according to the rationale of the dissenting opinion, the plaintiffs
in Ramsey should be required to show by clear proof not only that
the union officers were authorized agents of the union, but also that
the union participated in the conspiracy. The plaintiffs would thus
have to offer clear proof that the union, not just its officers, had
knowledge of a scheme designed to eliminate certain mine operators;
arguably, the plaintiffs would also have to offer clear proof that a
conspiracy existed. Practically speaking, it would appear impossible to
produce clear proof that the union authorized the conspiracy, absent
explicit authorization granted in the union's bylaws.
Acceptance of the dissenting argument would reinstate labor's
antitrust exemption, which was removed by Pennington. As a result,
only a procedural difference would separate the pre-Pennington rule
and the post-Ramsey-dissent rule. In the former, owing to the exemp-
tion from antitrust, the union was able to have the complaint dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted;" in
the latter, since the exemption is removed and a more stringent evi-
dentiary standard is applied, the union would be required to wait until
evidence is presented before moving for a directed verdict. 77
It is submitted that, although Ramsey serves to illuminate the
72
 Id. at 319-20.
72 Unilateral pursuit of this objective is ]awful as confirmed by Pennington, 381
U.S. at 665 n,2.
74 See discussion at p. 390 supra.
76 381 U.S. at 672-75.
76 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6).
77 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
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evidentiary issue regarding Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
national policy in labor-antitrust violation situations is in need of clari-
fication. This submission is supported by noting the three way division
of the Pennington Court and the number of justices dissenting in Ram-
sey. To resolve this situation, Congress must clarify its intent and the
national policy by introducing legislation defining the limits of labor's
exemption from antitrust liability. Union and employer representa-
tives need to know what subjects they may discuss at the bargaining
table, and what activities they may pursue, without fear of antitrust
liability. Absent such legislation, the collective bargaining process is in
danger of being driven underground, in contravention of the policy of
fostering that process as expressed in Section 2 of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act."
The effect of the Court's decision in Ramsey is to reaffirm, clarify,
and give force to the Pennington doctrine and to define the evidentiary
standard required by Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. However,
congressional action is needed to resolve the status of labor's exemp-
tion from antitrust liability in order to remove the danger which
existing ambiguities present to the collective bargaining process.
FRANCIS J. CONNELL
Trade Regulation—Antitrust Immunity—Quasi-Governmental Ac-
tion—Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. 1 —The Armory Board of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, a quasi-public body empowered to operate and
maintain federal government facilities in the district,' was authorized
by the federal Stadium Ace to build, operate and maintain an athletic
stadium.4 Accordingly, under a' contract with the Department of
Interior which previously had purchased the site, the Board built
R.F.K. Stadium and leased it to Pro-Football, Inc., the corporate
organization of the Washington Redskins football team. 5 The lease
provided that at no time during a thirty year term would the
Armory Board rent the stadium to any other professional football team.'
Relying upon this exclusive covenant, the Board refused to lease
78 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
1 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3081 (U.S.
July 23, 1971) (No. 71421).
2 2 D.C. Code § 1706 (1967).
8
 2 D.C. Code H 1720-28 (1967).
4 2 D.C. Code 9 1720 (1967).
5 444 F.2d at 932-33.
0 444 F.2d at 933. The exclusive covenant provided, in part, that:
[The Armory Board] . . . shall have the right to lease or otherwise permit the
use and occupancy of the Stadium during any period . . . provided that at no
time during the term of this Lease Agreement shall the Stadium be let or rented
to any professional football team other than the Washington Redskins.
Id. at 933.
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